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RESPECTING STATE
JUDICIAL ARTICLES
Jeffrey A Parness*
l. INTRODUCTION

Differences in the establishment and empowerment ofAmerican
judicial systems should trigger variations in the ways in which cases
are handled and law is practiced. Such differences are found in the
sections of state constitutions dealing with the judiciary and known
as judicial articles. Unfortunately, those differences are often overlooked. Perhaps the oversight is partially attributable to the widelyheld view that any variations in the constitutional foundations of
judicial systems are meaningless, in that no practical consequences
flow from them. In effect this view parallels the popular notion that
all seemingly comparable branches of state governments actually
have comparable powers, and that whatever differences exist
originate chiefly from such non-constitutional sources as political
ideology and community setting. A circuit court is a circuit court is a
circuit court. When you've seen one intermediate appellate court,
you've seen them all. Those sentiments are troubling because the
differences in state judicial articles are meaningful and should
result in significant consequences in judicial powers. Under current
American constitutional law, all trial courts do not possess the same
power to make substantive law; all high courts do not possess the
same authority to regulate the practice of law; and all judges do not
possess the same responsibility for checking legislative conduct.
This article will first explore some of the current differences in
state judicial articles, as well as some of the historical changes in the
judicial article of illinois. The article will then highlight a few of the
consequences that should flow from those differences. A brief
discussion of a few problems in differentiating state judicial articles
will conclude this article. In calling for more attention to constitutional language, this paper urges that as there has developed an
*Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. BA, 1970, Colby
College; J.D. 1974, The University of Chicago Law School. This paper was presented
on May 31, 1990, during the Third Annual Seminar on State Constitutional Law
sponsored by the National Association of Attorneys General. It follows and adds to
earlier written works on differences in state judicial articles, some of which are
cited.

66

EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL IAW 1990

increased sensitivity to the differences in individual rights from one
American state to another, there should also develop a heightened
recognition of and respect for variations in the structure, function
and operation of American judicial systems.
II. CONTEMPORARY STATE JUDICIAL ARTICLES AND THEIR HISTORY

A Comparing State Judicial Articles

A comparison of contemporary state judicial articles reveals
diverse approaches to the allocation and use of judicial power. State
constitutional provisions dealing ·with court structure and judicial
rulemaking are illustrative of this diversity.
Provisions on court structure vary ,videly in the extent of
responsibility accorded legislatures to establish or empower courts.
In lliinois, there is little room for legislation because the lliinois
Constitution vests the judicial power "in a Supreme Court, an
Appellate Court and Circuit Court," 1 and defines nearly all of these
courts' jurisdictional authority. 2 By contrast, other state constitutions grant enormous legislative responsibility over the judiciary.
For example, both the Rhode Island3 and Maine4 constitutions vest
judicial power in a supreme court and in such inferior courts as the
general assembly may establish.
Most state constitutions fall between those extremes. Those
constitutions typically create and empower some, but not all, courts,
often at the appellate level. The typical state constitution also allows
for some legislative influence on these courts and, yet, permits greater
legislative initiatives in creating and empowering other courts,
particularly trial courts oflimited jurisdiction. Michigan, for instance,
allocates judicial power to "one supreme court, one court of appeals,
one trial court
... one probate court, and courts
of limited jurisdiction
establish by a twothirds vote." 5
resides in "a
ILL. CONST. art VI, § 1.
ILL. CONST. art. VI.§§ 4 (the Illinois
defines the state Supreme
Court's jurisdictional authority but allows the
Court to provide by rule for
for
Court direct review of
appeals), 6 (legislature may provide
administrative action), and 9 (Circuit Courts
original jurisdiction over all
justiciable matters, but their power to revie\V administrative action is provided by
law).
3 RI. CONST. art. X, § 1.
4 ME. CONST. art VI, § l.
5
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § l. In Michigan, only the high court's jurisdiction is
without significant legislative guidance. Id. at§§ 4. 10, 13. and 15.
1

2
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such intermediate appellate courts as may be

by law, a superior court, such courts inferior to the superior
as may be provided by law, and justice courts."6

nrc-·,.,,·,irw,n

Although state constitutional provisions on court structure and
jurisdiction vmy, the resulting judicial systems are frequently
characterized similarly as "unified" or "integrated." Thus, the selfproclaimed unified court system in Wisconsin encompasses the
constitutionally-created supreme court, court of appeals and circuit
court, as well as any legislatively-created municipal court or other
courts of general jurisdiction.7 In North Carolina the unified
s:vstem contains only the Appellate, Superior and District Court
Divisions.8 The proclamation of unification in Idaho encompasses a
supreme court, district courts and any other legislatively-created
inferior courts,9 while in Georgia the unified system includes
magistrate, probate, juvenile, state and superior courts that operate
at the trial level. 10 Thus, just as protections of privacy interests differ
constitutionally from state to state, so, too, do the principles of court
unification.
State constitutional provisions on the rulemaking authority of
the judiciary in areas such as civil, criminal and appellate procedure,
evidence, and attorney and judicial conduct are equally divergent
These provisions differ regarding the composition of judicial rulemaking bodies, as well as the oversight role of the legislature.
Judicial rulemaking bodies encompass individuals or groups
which contain at least a single judge and possess some decisionmaking responsibility for rules affecting the judicial system. 11
Usually, such bodies are courts. Thus, many state high courts are
recognized constitutionally as judicial rulemakers. State constitutions often delegate to courts of last resort duties regarding civil,
criminal, appellate and professional conduct rules. 12 In contrast,

6 ARiz. CONST. art. VI, § 1. In Arizona legislation pertaining to supreme court and
superior court jurisdiction is apparently far more limited than legislation affecting
the power of other courts. Id. at§§ 5, 9, 14, 16 and 32.
7 WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
8 N.C. CONST. art. N, § 2.
9 IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
lO GA CONST. art. VI,§§ 1, 2.
11 For a review of types of American judicial rulemakers, see Parness and
Manthey,PublicProcessandStateJudicialRulemaking, l PACEL.REv.121.125-27
( 1980) (emphasizing the need for greater sensitivity to the stages of rulemaking and
to the distinctions between fettered and unfettered rulemaking authority).
12 See, e.g.,ALAsKACONST.art. N, § 15 (rulesgovemingtheadministrationofall
courts, as well as rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases
all courts); ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 5 (rules relative to all procedural matters in any
ARK CONST. amend. 28 (rules regulating the practice of law and the
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California empowers a Judicial Council to adopt "rules for court
administration, practice and procedure." The Judicial Council contains judges from a variety of courts, as well as members of the state
bar and a few legislators. 13 In New York, the chiefjudge of the highest
court has extensive rulemaking authority regarding "standards and
administrative policies for general application throughout the
state." 14
As with the establishment of judicial rulemaking bodies, state
constitutions vary regarding the role of the legislature in overseeing
judicial rulemaking. Some provisions mandate that judicial rules not
contravene any existing statutes, 15 while others dictate that judicial
rules not conflict with statutes addressing only certain topics. 16 Yet,
other provisions seemingly permit judicial rules to supersede
statutes. 17
Beyond concern for existing statutes, state constitutions vary on
whether judicial rulemakers must submit their rules to legislative
review. In Ohio, proposed practice and procedure rules cannot take
effect unless the GeneralAssembly has had the opportunity to adopt
"a concurrent resolution of disapproval." 18 In South Carolina, however, similar proposed rules take effect unless three-fifths of the
members of each house disapprove of them. 19
By contrast, some state constitutions provide for legislative
oversight regarding the work of judicial rulemakers only after the
rules take effect. In Florida, the Supreme Court can adopt rules of
practice without seeking the approval of the legislature. However,
these rules "may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds
vote of the membership of each house." 20 Likewise, in Maryland,
similar judicial rules only have force "until rescinded, changed or

professional conduct of attorneys at law); N.J. CONST. art VI,§ II (rules governing the
administration of all courts and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all
such courts): N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (rules of procedure, including appellate
procedure, for all courts. as well as rules and regulations for the admission to
practice. conduct. disciplining. and disbarment of attorneys at law); OHIO CONST art.
IV, § 5(a)( 1) (rules regarding general superintendence over all courts).
13
CAL. CoNsT art. v1. § 6.
14 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 28.
15
See, e.g.. 1A CONST. art \,1. § 5: Nm. CONST. art. Vl. § 25.
16
Mo. CONST. art. 5. § 5 (rules cannot alter laws on evidence or the oral
examination of witnesses).
17
OHIO CONST. art. IV.§ 5(b) (laws in conflict with rules have no further force or
effect). q. N.C. CONST. art. IV,§ 13(2) ("exclusive" high court authority to make rules
for the Appellate Division).
18
Omo CONST. art. IV,§ 5(B) (practice and procedure rules).
19
S.C. CONST. art V, § 4 (practice and procedure rules).
20
FIA CONST. art VI. § 2(a) (practice and procedure rules).
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law."21 Also, in Montana
procedure and
conduct rules are "subject to
the legisof the two sessions following promulgation."22
Judicial Articles qf Illinois

Many of the contemporary constitutional differences among
states in court structure and judicial rulemaking are comparable to
constitutional differences found within a particular state over a
of time. For example, the illinois constitutional history on
power reflects significant shifts in the balance of power
between the 9eneral Assembly and the courts.
TheillinoisConstitutionofl818,expresslygrantedbroadduties
regarding the judiciary to the General Assembly. Most importantly,
the Assembly had the power to ordain and establish courts inferior to
supreme court.23 Under the illinois Constitution of 1848, the
legislature's authori1y over the illinois courts was reduced. Thus, the
General Assembly's total control over lower court structure was
eliminated. A new constitutional provision created circuit courts and
defined the jurisdiction of those courts.24 Coun1yjudges and justices
of the peace, however, remained under legislative direction.25
Under the 1870 amendments to the illinois Constitution a
further erosion oflegislative authori1y transpired. For example, the
new constitutional provisions on coun1y and probate courts diminished legislative control over these courts.26 Nevertheless, extensive
legislative authori1y over some courts continued. Specifically, the
1870 amendments recognized expressly the legislature's power to
create inferior appellate courts and to establish certain probate
courts.27
General Assembly responsibili1y for the judiciary was further
reduced in 1962. A new constitutional amendment declared, "The
judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and
Circuit Courts."28 No longer were lower courts to be established by
statute. Other amendments wholly or substantially eliminated legis-

21
22

Mo. CONST. art. IV,§ 18(a) (practice and procedure
MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (practice and procedure,

appellate procedure rules).
2 l ILL. CONST. of 1818 art. V, § 1.
ILL. CONST. of 1848 art. V, § 8.
!LL. CONST. of 1848 art. V, §§ 18, 19.
CONST. of 1870 art. VI, §§ 18, 20.
CONST. of 1870 art. VI, § 20.
of 1870 art. VI,§ 1 (1962).

rules).
professional conduct, and
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lative authority to define the subject-matter jurisdiction of lower
courts.29
The movement toward increased constitutional establishment
and empowerment of illinois courts continued under the 1970
constitution. Thus, while a 1962 amendment granted to the supreme
court the authority to provide for certain appellate rules "subject to
law hereafter enacted," 30 the 1970 constitution recognized such
rulemaking without noting the impact oflegislation.31
The trend in illinois is clear. Constitutional history from 1818 to
1970 reflects diminishing General Assembly control over the judicial
system. Over time, the legislature's power to create and empower
courts has diminished. Increasingly, constitutional mandates appeared, and, where ambiguous, judges usually interpreted the
mandates.
The llinois experience is comparable to developments in other
American states. Such developments, in some part. are attributable
to the push for more unified court systems (spurred by the American
Bar Association. the American
the National
Municipal League. and
today approach court
Thus. the
judiciaries on
differ greatly, as
in many
individual states.
In
rulemaking, constate judicial articles and in
siderable
state
exist in such areas as court financing,
the
selecting or removing judges, the terms of
and the judicial role in rendering advisory opinions.
judicial
Some courts are state-financed, while others are locally-financed.
Judges may be elected in partisan or non-partisan elections. They
may serve terms ranging from 2 to 15 years. State high courts may or
may not have the duty to advise the legislature or the governor on the
legality of certain conduct. Variations in those areas result in further
differences in separation of powers principles from state to state and
in a single state over a period of time.

29

Compare ILL.CONST.of 1870art. VI,§§ 11, 12, with ILL.CONST.of 1870art. VI,§§

7, 9 (1962) (legislature's authority over appellate and circuit court jurisdiction).
3o ILL.CONST.of 1870 art VI,§ 5 (1962).
31 ..J:LL.

CONST art. VI, § 4(b ).

Ashman and Parness, The Concept Qf a Unified Court System, 24 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1 (1974) (tracing the unification movement).
32
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variations between
of the
can occur over time in a single state's
several
arise. First, what impact do those differences in constimight
rhetoric have upon judicial systems? Second,
differences properly influence the resolution of troubling
contemporary issues?
Consider first state legislative authority to remove civil disputes
courts and to place them within the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Such removals are increasingly attractive to
legislators concerned with the delays and costs of traditional
Htigation. Legislatures are presently discussing removals for certain
cases such as medical malpractice actions.33 Even with an
ex1)ressly recognized right to trial by jwy, legislative removal of
judicial jurisdiction should be easier for a state legislature which
remains chiefly responsible for defining the business of the state's
courts. Legislative removal is more problematic where the
courts' jurisdiction over the diverted cases is constitutionally recognized. Individual interests such as the right to jury trial are not the
only limits upon the extent of a legislature's removal authority.34
Rather, the unique approach to the separation of legislative and
judicial powers that the constitutional drafters adopted also limits
removal authority. Thus, removal of medical malpractice actions may
occur in some states via statute, but in other states only after
constitutional amendment. 35
Consider also the legislative authority to delegate certain litigation duties of traditional trial judges to quasi-judicial or parajudicial officers.36 Questions about such authority have been and are
currently raised in the federal judiciary with respect to tasks

3 3 American Medical Association/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, A
Proposed Alternative to the Civil Justice Systemjor Resolving Medical Liability
Disputes: A Fault-Based, Administrative System (January, 1988).

3 4 Other personal rights occasionally asserted during challenges to legislative
removal of disputes from traditional courts include access to courts, full legal redress
or remedy, equal protection, and due process.
Case law is somewhat more developed in the federal system than in most
though certainly not fully illuminating. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide
i\gricultural Products Co., 4 73 U.S. 568 (1985) (reviewing and applying precedential
disllnctions between public rights and private rights cases).
commentary on such officers is found in Parness, The Parajudge\l/heels cf Justice, 10 TRIAL54 (March/April, 1974).
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assigned to magistrates37 and bankruptcy judges.38 Similar questions on the state level can be answered only after there is a
comprehensive review of the judicial article and other relevant
constitutional sources. Para.judicial activity in trial courts is more
problematic when the responsibilities of trial judges for and during
litigation are constitutionally defined.
Another troubling contemporary issue demanding separation of
powers analysis involves legislative power to cap or abolish certain
damages. Again, such legislative authority should be easier to
sustain if the jurisdiction of state courts is subject to legislative
invention rather than constitutionally defined. Seemingly, a court
whose power to hear a case is dependent upon legislative will is in a
weaker position to question a limit or ban on non-economic or
punitive damages than is a court invested vvith the constitutional
responsibility to hear and resolve the case. In other words, the court's
power to make common law rulings contravening statutes is
somewhat more doubtful when the power to adjudicate the dispute is
dependent upon statute.
Unfortunately, at least some courts considering the legitimacy of
such monetary caps have focused exclusively on the constitutionallyprotected right to jury trial (and other individual rights). 39 That
emphasis seems misplaced because the jury only infrequently
determines the substantive law. 'Iypically the jury only applies the
facts the jury finds to the law that others determine. Those courts
have failed to focus on what their own constitutionally assigned
tasks of resolving civil disputes encompass. Does the job of civil
dispute resolution inevitably include the task of establishing, or at
least helping to enforce, certain substantive law regardless of what
the legislature says? Is there some deeply-rooted common lawmaking

37 See, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989) (may magistrates
preside at jui:y selection in felony trials without defendant's consent?); United States
v. Demarrias, 876 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1989) (may magistrates accept jui:y verdicts in
criminal cases when judges are out of town?); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F.
Supp. 151 7 (D. Minn. 1989) (may magistrates accept jui:y verdicts in civil cases after
sending the jui:y back to complete a special verdict form?).
38 See, e.g., In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990) (may bankruptcy
judges preside over certain civil jui:y trials?), cert granted sub nom Insurance Co. of
Pav. Ben Cooper, 58 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. June 6, 1990) (No. 89-1784).
39 See, e.g., English v. New England Medical Center. 405 Mass. 423, 541 N.E.2d
329 (1989) (considering the constitutionality ofa cap on chart table institution's tort
liability in light of individual jui:y trial, equal protection and due process rights). q
Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989) (addressing the
constitutionality of a cap on noneconomic damages in light of individual rights and
separation of powers). Incidentally. litigants' failure to raise separation of powers
issues normally should not preclude their consideration.
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power
troubling contemporary issue

to fund courts adequately. Such a ,c,:;;,""''"'

rnore compelling if there are huge backlogs in
cases
relevant judicial article mandates court jurisdiction over
cases. The nature of the legislature's funding duty should not
exclusively on such individual constitutional rights as jury trial,
anr'es;s to courts or a remedy for every wrong. The mandate that no
branch of government should unduly burden the ability of
branch to fulfill its assigned functions is no trivial matter.
Finally, consider the relevance of differences in current judicial
to questions about who oversees the practice oflaw; stated
who regulates admission to legal practice, the discipline of
lav,yers, judicial ethics, and the like. Many courts simply cite to their
power, and then declare that such responsibility' lies with
the judiciary.40 However, such inherent power is easier to rationalize
courts are constitutionally established and empowered; if the
courts are constitutionally authorized to hear admission to practice
lawyer discipline cases; or if rulemaking for the legal profession is
delegated constitutionally to the courts. Courts whose creation,
Jurisdiction and rules depend upon the legislature may well have
inherent power over the legal profession inhering in statute.
inherent power seems much weaker than judicial power
deriving from judicial articles that establish courts, define adjudicatory duties, and delegate judicial rulemaking responsibilities.
N. THE DIFFICULTIES IN REsPECTING DIFFERENCES
IN AMERICAN JUDICIAL ARTICLES

The awareness of the differences in American judicial articles
and their relevance to many current issues does not insure sensitivity to the varying separation of powers schemes. In fact, certain
forces create difficulties for those courts striving to be more sensitive.
One complicating force is the duty' to be bound, and the desire to
be guided, by federal law. In particular, troubles often ensue because
of the fundamental differences between constitutional rights and
constitutional judicial systems. In the area of individual rights,
federal guarantees stand as the minimum threshold below which no
state may go. Thus, in many cases involving state constitutional
w For a critical examination of two differing state high court declarations about

ability to mandate openness in judicial rulemaking, see Parness, Com-

American Judicial Systems, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 171, 181-6 (1990).
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rights, courts must first consider federal rights. In addition, notwithstanding such notable exceptions as the right to privacy, state courts
often look to federal case law for guidance on the scope of state law
because many state constitutional rights are grounded in language
comparable to the language in the federal Constitution.
There is today, however, little federal constitutional constraint
on the establishment of state judicial systems. Federal law says little
about the separation of legislative and judicial responsibilities for a
state's legal profession.41 Little federal due process or equal protection
authority addresses whether there should be state trial courts of
limited jurisdiction, some form of legislative power to influence
judicial rules, or state-funded courts. Thus, the federal Constitution42
appears to permit considerable state variations on those and other
related questions, but not on many questions of individual rights.
Also, the judicial article of the federal Constitution has not been
significantly amended since the nation's founding. 43 Furthermore,
the United States Constitution delegates to Congress enormous
discretion regarding the establishment and empowerment of federal
courts.44 Many state judicial articles have a different history and
content. The illinois experience and the comparison of state judicial
articles governing court structure and judicial rulemaking exemplify
those differences. Thus, employing federal precedents as guides to

41 Professor Wolfram has vvritten: "Separation of powers doctrines of state and
federal constitutional law. in general terms. do not directly affect each other. Thus no
federal constitutional principle
the st:'1tes to follow, or restricts the states
from adopting, any particular concept.ion of separation of powers among the
branches of state government" Wolfram. MoDERl\l LEGAL Ennes 33 (West Pub. Co.
1986). In the absence of federal limits. states have chosen differing paths. Compare,
e.g., ARK CONST. amend. 28 ('The Supreme Court shall makes rules regulating the
practice oflaw and the professional conduct of attorneys at law."); with N.D. CONST.
art. VI,§ 3 ("The supreme court shall have authority ... unless otheIWise provided by
law, to promulgate rules and regulations for the admission to practice, conduct
disciplining, and disbarment of attorneys at law." ); and, S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12 ("The
Supreme Court by rule shall govern ... admission to the bar, and discipline of
members of the bar. These rules may be changed by the legislature.").
42 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
43 But see U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.").
44 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."). The limits on such discretion are unclear. Gunther.

Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide
to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895 ( 1984).
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questions involving
in overseeing the legal profession
between federal and state constitutional theory
power create further difficulties for those courts
respecting their state's unique approach. Again, the
!,;;,,,-,,"'""'"' °''''"'""",''"'''"' is often misleading. Debates about the values of
founding fathers and about original intent, typically
consideration of questions of federal constitutional
are usually inappropriate during debates on state judicial
Unlike article III of the federal Constitution which governs
judiciary, state judicial articles have been frequently
Those amendments often reflect differing views about the
role of the legislature in regulating the judiciary. The result is
in many states, more legislative history and differing constitheories exist than with the federal Constitution. Thus, it is
necessary to read a state constitutional provision on the
in the context not only of the current judicial article, but
in the context of earlier judicial articles in which the same
appeared.
It is possible for the meaning of a single state constitutional
to have changed over time because its context has been
Unfortunately, that change is not always recognized. For
many state constitutions contain a longstanding provision
the state's judicial power in a supreme court. Occasionally,
courts read such provisions comparably over time, even though other
provisions in their judicial article have been subject to
a.111endment.Amendments have often yielded provisions recognizing
high court's rulemaking power, or eliminating references to the
legislature's influence on high court jurisdiction and court-promulrules. Such amendments should affect judicial interpretations
provisions vesting judicial power in a high court.
Thus, the so-called inherent power of a high court should vary
\Vith the amendments of the judicial article provisions governing
that court. This analysis further suggests that dangers exist in the
rather commonplace practice of one state court using a second
state's precedents to determine the parameters of inherent judicial
power. 45 As American judicial articles vary on matters of court
strncture, court rulemaking, court financing and the like, so, too,
should the unwritten, inherent powers ofAmerican courts vary from
state to state.

unfortunate use is reviewed in Parness, supra note 40, at 181-6.
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Finally, the need to examine the model provisions or recommended standards of such national groups as the American Bar
Association, the American Judicature Society, and the National
Municipal League further complicates inquiries into the constitutional histoiy of a state judicial article. The works of these bodies
are relevant because each body promulgated a series of proposals this
centu:iy which gained the attention of at least some state constitutional drafters. Yet, the proposals of these national organizations
have differed with each other, and each organization's proposals
have been changed over time. 46 Perhaps these changes help to
explain the differing approaches today to the concept of a unified
court system. The need to consider the varying reforms suggested by
national organizations certainly adds to the difficulties involved in
respecting differences in separation of powers principles among
states.
V. CONCLUSION

Extensive variations now exist in American constitutional
provisions on the judiciary. Those variations frequently compel
different relationships between the legislature and the courts.
Nonetheless, those variations are often overlooked by courts and
commentators. Perhaps as a result, an incorrect impression of
comparability has developed, which presumes similarity from state
to state in such matters as the balance of legislative and judicial
duties regarding the legal profession. The time has come to recognize
fully the differences in American judicial articles, as well as the
rationales underlying the varying approaches that our state governments have taken. Such a sensitivity should prompt more
informed, though perhaps seemingly inconsistent, state judicial
decisions in such troubling areas as administrative agency adjudication, the use of parajudicial officers, statutoiy limits on damages,
the adequacy of court funding, and the regulation of the legal
profession. Yet, respect for the differences in state judicial articles
often will not be easy. Complications will arise because differences
exist in the content and histoiy of the federal Constitution and
because difficulties exist in assessing state constitutional histoiy.

46

Ashman and Parness, supra note 32, at 5-17.

